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INTRODUCTION

The Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of
Appeals ("The Commission") submitted its report and suggestions to the
United States Congress and the President in December 1998. 1 The
Commission, which Congress authorized during November 1997, spent
ten months studying the "structure and alignment of the Federal Court of
Appeals system, with particular reference to the Ninth Circuit," and two
months developing "recommendations for such changes in circuit
boundaries or structure as may be appropriate for the expeditious and
effective disposition of the caseload of the Federal Courts of Appeals,
consistent with fundamental concepts of fairness and due process."2 The
centerpiece of the Commission's proposal is the suggestion that Congress
require the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to
implement three regionally-based adjudicatory divisions and authorize
the remaining appellate courts to institute divisional arrangements as
they increase in size. Lawmakers intended that the Commission craft
recommendations which would help Congress resolve the controversial,
ongoing debate over the Ninth Circuit and to address the dramatic
caseload expansion that has transformed the appeals courts from the
institutions which they were a generation ago.
Indeed, the
Commission's report and proposals could well chart the destiny of the
appellate courts for the twenty-first century.
It should not be surprising, therefore, that the suggestions proffered by
the Commission have received great attention. Many federal court
observers, including members of the judicial and legislative branches,
have expended much energy analyzing and responding to the
recommendations. For example, Procter Hug, Jr., the Chief Judge of the
United States Courts for the Ninth Circuit, which figured prominently in
the Commission's study and proposals, authored a cogent critique of the
suggestions.3
Numerous legal scholars have evaluated the
recommendations and reached positive and negative condusions.4

' See Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, Final
Report 29 [hereinafter Final Report]. Citations to Final Report can be found at
http:/ /app.comm.uscourts.gov (last visited Oct. 25, 2000). Hard copies of all cited Final
Report Documents are on file with the UC Davis Law Review.
' Department of Justice Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305, 111 Stat.
2491 (1997).
3
See Procter Hug, Jr., The Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of
Appeals' Final Report: An Analysis of the Commission's Recommendations for the Ninth Circuit, 32
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 887 (1999).
• See, e.g., Arthur D. Hellman, The Unkindest Cut: The White Commission's Proposal to
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Several senators, who represent Pacific Northwest states and who have
been ardent proponents of splitting the Ninth Circuit into two appeals
courts, introduced proposed legislation that adopted almost verbatim
the statutory reforms suggested by the Commission a month after their
issuance. 5
Virtually all of the examination which evaluators have devoted to the
Commission's work shares one salient characteristic, however. In the
commentators' apparent haste to praise or criticize the Commission's
recommendations, they have essentially ignored the elaborate
descriptive account of the appellate courts that the commissioners
compiled. For instance, observers have neglected the Working Papers of
the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of
Appeals. 6 This 348-page volume includes a number of studies which the
Commission authorized and much information which it collected. The
commissioners seemed to consult these materials closely in fashioning
the report and proposals.
The dearth of attention that commentators have accorded the
Commission's description is remarkable. The Commission appeared to
depend heavily on the descriptive account when drafting its report and
suggestions.
Change which is as drastic as the commissioners
recommended in institutions that are as critical as the appeals courts
should correspondingly have clear, substantial empirical support. The
Commission also painted a rather detailed portrait of the appellate
system or at least took numerous snapshots of the appeals courts, which
yield instructive insights on them at the tum of the century and could
inform their future reform and investigation. Indeed, the commissioners
may well have constructed one of the richest modem accounts of those
courts, thereby making the absence of scrutiny afforded the description
even more striking.
The above propositions mean that the descriptive account which the
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals
compiled warrants analysis. This article undertakes that effort. The first
section evaluates the origins and development of the Commission and
briefly describes its work. The second section selectively assesses the

Restructure the Ninth Circuit, 73 S. CAL. L. REv. 377 (2000); Jennifer E. Spreng, Three Divisions
In One Circuit?, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 551 (1999); Carl Tobias, A Federal Appellate System for the
Twenty-First Century, 74 WASH. L. REv. 275 (1999).
5
Compare S. 253, 106th Cong. (1999) with Final Report, supra note l, at 93. In March
2000, senators introduced a circuit-splitting bill. See S. 2184, 106th Cong. (2000).
' See Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals,
Working Papers i-ii (1998) [hereinafter Working Papers].
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Commission's description and attempts to derive from the account
useful perspectives on the twelve, specific regional circuits and the
appellate system as well as additional, helpful lessons respecting the
Commission's endeavors. Most significant, particular appeals courts
appear to operate less efficaciously than they might. However, the
empirical evidence which the Commission adduced appears insufficient
to support definitive conclusions regarding the circuits' present
condition, much less modifications that seem as dramatic as those which
the commissioners proposed. The final section, therefore, suggests that
Congress reject the Commission's recommendations and authorize
further study, which should permit more conclusive determinations
about the courts, or experimentation with promising measures.
I. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF 1HE COMMISSION AND 1HE
COMMISSION'S WORK

The historical events which led senators and representatives to
authorize the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal
Courts of Appeals, as well as the commissioners' efforts, deserve
comparatively limited consideration in this paper because they have
received relatively thorough analysis elsewhere. 7 Nonetheless, some
treatment of the Commission's origins, development and work is
justified. This type of examination can enhance appreciation of the
Commission's descriptive account. For instance, it is important to
understand that the commissioners completed the fourth significant
evaluation of the federal courts in the last decade and that they built
upon the three prior assessments.8

A. Authorization of the Commission
The immediate impetus for Congress to create the Commission was
the continuing controversy which has involved the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The great size of the court has
' See, e.g., Hellman, supra note 4; Hug, supra note 3; Spreng, supra note 4; Carl Tobias,
Suggestions for Studying the Federal Appellate System, 49 FLA. L. REv. 189 (1997).
8
See JUDITH MCKENNA, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, STRUCTURAL AND OTHER
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS (1993); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
COMMfITEE, REPoRT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMfITEE (1990) (hereinafter
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY REPORT]; JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LoNG
RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS (December 1995) (hereinafter LoNG RANGE PLAN];
see also COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS, H.R. REP.
No. 105-26, at 2 (1997) (suggesting that Commission would build on Federal Courts Study
Committee's work) [hereinafter HOUSE REPoRT].
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prompted efforts to restructure the Ninth Circuit virtually since
9
lawmakers established the federal appellate system during 1891. The
notion of magnitude encompasses the large complement of twenty-eight
active appellate judges that Congress has authorized for the court, the
circuit's substantial docket of nearly 9000 annual cases and the court's
enormous geographic expanse of almost 1,350,000 square miles, which
have allegedly promoted inconsistent, inefficient and incorrect decision
making. 10 Recent, serious efforts to bifurcate the Ninth Circuit began a
decade and a half ago, while members of Congress who favor division
have attempted to split the court on numerous occasions.11
Republican Senators, who primarily represent states which are located
in the Pacific Northwest, commenced the latest campaign to realign the
Ninth Circuit during May 1995 by introducing a proposal that would
have modified the appellate court. 12 In the first session of the 104th
Congress, the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary adopted
a bill which would have restructured the Ninth Circuit. 13 The measure's
advocates lacked sufficient support to secure full Senate approval and,
therefore, developed a compromise that would have authorized a
national commission to analyze all of the appeals courts. 14 The United
States House of Representatives did not enact substantive legislation
which would have created a commission; however, the House
appropriated $500,000 for an evaluation.15
During the initial session of the 105th Congress, senators and
representatives introduced bills that would have split the Ninth Circuit
or which would have instituted a study of the federal appellate system. 16

' See Final Report, supra note 1, at 33; see generally NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
REORGANIZATION ACTOF1995, s. REP. No. 104-197 (1995) [hereinafterSENATEREPoRT].
10
See Final Report, supra note 1, at 34-36.
11
See id. at 33-34. See generally Tobias, supra note 7, at 196-214.
12
See S. 956, 104th Cong. (1995). See generally Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, A Ninth Circuit
Split Study Commission: Naw What?, 57 MONT. L. REv. 313, 313-15 (1996); Carl Tobias, The
Impoverished Idea of Circuit-Splitting, 44 EMORY L. J. 1357 (1995).
13
See s. 956; SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, Markup of s. 956 (Dec. 7, 1995). See
generally SENATE REPORT, supra note 9; Jennifer E. Spreng, The Icebox Cometh: A Former
Clerk's View of the Proposed Ninth Circuit Split, 73 WASH. L. REV. 875, 887 (1998).
" See 142 CONG. REC. S254 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996) (statement of Sen. Murkowski).
See generally Carl Tobias, A Proposal to Study the Federal Appellate System, 167 F.R.D. 275, 279
(1996).
15
See 142 CONG. REC. Hll,848, Hll,859 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996). See generally
Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Vacated, and Split: The Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the
Congress, 77 OR. L. REV. 405, 409 (1998).
1
'
See, e.g., S. 431, 105th Cong. (1997); S .248, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 908, 105th Cong.
(1997); see also Tobias, supra note 7, at 205-14 (analyzing developments in 105th Congress).

554

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 34:549

In June 1997, the House of Representatives unanimously approved a
measure that would have implemented an assessment of the appeals
courts. 17 The next month, senators who championed Ninth Circuit
division persuaded the upper chamber to adopt an appropriations rider
which would have reconfigured the appellate court. 18 However,
members of the House - including the entire delegation from the state of
California and Representative Henry Hyde (R-lli.), Chair of the House
Judiciary Committee - opposed bifurcation. Congress eventually agreed
to a compromise that authorized a national evaluation. 19 The legislation
empowered the Chief Justice of the United States to name the
Commission's five members no later than thirty days from the date of
statutory passage. 20 The measure accorded the commissioners ten
months to "study the structure and alignment of the Federal Court of
Appeals system, with particular reference to the Ninth Circuit," and two
months to draft a report with recommendations for such "changes in
circuit boundaries or structure as may be appropriate for the expeditious
and effective disposition of the caseload of the Federal Courts of
Appeals, consistent with fundamental concepts of fairness and due
process. "21
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist selected as Commission members
retired United States Supreme Court Associate Justice Byron R. White,
Sixth Circuit Judge Gilbert S. Merritt, Ninth Circuit Judge Pamela Ann
Rymer, District Judge William D. Browning of Arizona and immediate
past American Bar Association President N. Lee Cooper. 22 Lawmakers
wisely appropriated generous resources of $900,000 that ostensibly could
have permitted the Commission to perform a thoroughgoing analysis. 23
However, Congress assigned the relatively small number of
commissioners a potentially gigantic task and accorded the five
individuals a truncated period for completing all of the work entailed. 24
For instance, the Commission had less time to evaluate the appellate

" See H.R. 908, 105th Cong. (1997); 143 CONG. REC. H3223 (daily ed. June 3, 1997)
(statement of Rep. Coble).
" See S. 1022, 105th Cong.,§ 305 (1997); 143 CONG. REC. 58041 (daily ed. July 24, 1997)
(statement of Sen. Feinstein).
" See Department of Justice Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305, 111
Stat. 2491 (1997).
"' See Department of Justice Appropriation Act§§ 305(a)(2)(A)-(B).
21
Department of Justice Appropriation Act § 305(a)(l)(B); see also Tobias, supra note 7,
at 206-11 (analyzing measure).
22
See Final Report, supra note 1, at 1, 92.
23
See Department ofJustice Appropriation Act§ 305(b).
" See Department of Justice Appropriation Act§ 305(a)(6).

2000]

Federal Appeals Courts at Century's End

555

courts than most of the circuits need for deciding appeals 25 and a shorter
period and fewer members1Jthan similar, earlier entities, including the
Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System
("Hruska Commission"), the Federal Courts Study Committee and the
Long Range Planning Committee of the Judicial Conference of the
United States. 26 This situation may have seriously compromised what
the Commission could achieve.

B. The Commission's Efforts
The commissioners seemed to discharge faithfully the substantial
statutory responsibilities that Congress assigned the Commission. 27
Throughout 1998, the Commission attempted to solicit considerable
public input. During the spring, the entity conducted six public hearings
at which eighty-nine witnesses testified in metropolitan areas across the
country: Atlanta, Dallas, Chicago, New York, Seattle and San Francisco.28
Five of these cities currently serve as the headquarters for regional
circuits, while Seattle would apparently be the headquarters of any new
Twelfth Circuit that Congress might create from the current Ninth
Circuit.
The Commission worked closely with the Federal Judicial Center (FJC)
and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the primary
research and administrative arms of the federal courts, which lawmakers
astutely authorized the commissioners to consult. 29 Some FJC staff, who
served as expert advisors for the commissioners, had been actively
involved in prior studies of the federal judicial system. Two experienced
FJC employees assumed major responsibility for designing surveys that
the Commission circulated to appeals and district court judges and
appellate attorneys, which sought their perspectives on the regional
circuits' operations. Moreover, one FJC employeee and several other FJC
25
See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 95 tbl.7; U.S. Courts of Appeals, Median Time
Intervals in Cases Terminated After Hearing or Submission, By Circuit During the TwelveMonth Period Ending Dec. 31, 1999.
26
See Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, The Geographical
Boundaries of the Several Judicial Circuits: Recommendations for Change, 62 F.R.D. 223 (1973)
[hereinafter Hruska Commission]; LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 8, FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
REPORT, supra note 8.
77
See Final Report, supra note 1%t 1-6.
" See id. at 2-3.
29
See id. at 3-4; see also De~ent of Justice Appropriation Act § 305(a)(4)(D)
(authorizing Commission to secure research services from FJC and administrative services
from Administrative Office of U.S. iourts); 28 U.S.C. § 620 et seq. (1994) (authorizing FJC);
28 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (1994) (authorizing Administrative Office).
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staff members undertook numerous analyses of the courts at the entity's
behest.30
The Commission also assembled statistical material related to the
functioning of the regional circuits. For example, the entity collected
information on the percentage of cases that the appellate courts accord
oral arguments and written dispositions, on the time which the tribunals
require to decide appeals, and on the measures that circuits have used to
address the steadily rising dockets which have substantially altered the
appellate courts since the 1970s.31
The Commission members analyzed all of the input that they had
gathered or had received. On October 7, 1998, the Commission
published a tentative draft report and recommendations on which the
Commission sought public comment during a thirty-day period.32 Some
people and interests that the Commission draft determinations and
recommendations would affect responded favorably. However, more
observers submitted comments which criticized those findings and
suggestions. Individuals and entities with quite diverse views evinced
considerable dissatisfaction. 330nce the commissioners examined the
public comments, they made minor changes in the tentative draft report
and published a final report on December 18.34
In short, the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal
Courts of Appeals attempted to fulfill conscientiously the burdensome
duties that Congress imposed in the limited time provided by senators
and representatives. The Commission members assembled relevant
material on the intermediate appeals courts, widely sought public input,
pinpointed the most troubling problems which the circuits apparently
encounter and fashioned remedies for these complications that the
commissioners seemingly thought would be effective. Despite the
Commission's efforts, the Commission failed to adduce persuasive
30

31

See Final Report, supra note 1, at 4; Working Papers, supra note 6, at ii.
See Final Report, supra note 1, at 21-25, 39; see also FEDERAL COURTS STUDY REPORT,

supra note 8, at 109 (stating that caseload increases have transformed Circuits).
32
See Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, Tentative
Draft Report (Oct. 7, 1998) [hereinafter Draft Report]; see also Hug, supra note 3, at 894-95
(comparing tentative draft report and final report).
33
See, e.g., American Bar Association, Comments to the Commission on Structural
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (Nov. 6, 1998); U.S. Dept. of Justice,
Comments to the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals
(Nov. 6, 1998); Todd D. True, Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund, Comments to the
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (Nov. 6, 1998);
Harry Edwards et al., Comments to the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the
Federal Courts of Appeals (Nov. 10, 1998).
" See Final Report, supra note 1.

2000)

Federal Appeals Courts at Century's End

557

empirical evidence that clearly demonstrates that the courts now
experience complications which are problematic enough to deserve
treatment. This is particularly true with measures that appear as
potentially inefficacious as the divisional arrangement proposed.
Nevertheless, the commissioners did compile a helpful description of the
regional circuits at the close of the twentieth century.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE COMMISSION DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT
This section selectively evaluates the Commission's descriptive
account and attempts to extract from this description informative
insights on individual appeals courts and the whole appellate system as
well as additional instructive ideas. The section also discusses how
particular circuits may be functioning less effectively than they could.
Finally, this section argues that the empirical data and remaining
material, which the Commission collected and assessed, cannot support
definitive conclusions respecting the current circumstances of the courts
or major reform.
A. Specific Appeals Courts
1. An Introductory Word

The Commission accumulated, analyzed and synthesized considerable
empirical evidence and other applicable information on the twelve,
specific circuits, much pertaining to the 1997 fiscal year, the most recent
period for which the material was available. 35 The objective information
implicates numerous parameters, including the time from case filing to
disposition, that are "routinely used in court administration to measure
the performance and efficiency of the federal appellate courts."36 The
commissioners correspondingly consulted "subjective criteria, such as
consistency and predictability of [circuit law, which] are obviously more
difficult to evaluate but are widely regarded as a high priority" for these

35

The Commission did compile some historical data. References to annual data in this
article are for the 1997 fiscal year, unless otherwise indicated. See Working Papers, supra
note6.
36
Final Report, supra note 1, at 39. "These include the number of appeals a court
disposes of ('dispositions') or ('terminations') relative to the number of cases filed, how
many cases are orally argued and how many are decided on the briefs, how many
dispositions result in published opinions and how many in unpublished memoranda or
summary orders, the time from filing to disposition, and how often the court relies on
visiting judges from outside the circuit." Id.
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tribunals, primarily by conducting surveys of appeals and district court
judges as well as appellate attomeys. 37
When this material is considered together for each circuit, the
information forms a composite picture or profile.
Indeed, the
comparison of every court's performance with the national average and
with the efforts compiled by the remaining eleven circuits suggests how
well individual courts work, subject to appropriate caveats, regarding,
for instance, relevance and reliability. As a general matter, objective
numerical data will be highly relevant and dependable. Specific
examples are the percentages of oral arguments and published opinions
which circuits afford.
That statistical material has considerable
applicability, because it can reflect how substantially courts honor
important process values involving access to justice, while the
information is more reliable than survey responses, which are subjective
and can be self-interested.
Although objective numerical data are generally dependable, they
often must be refined, contextualized or elaborated. One helpful
illustration is the number of appeals that a circuit terminates compared
to the quantity of filings that the court receives. 38 This comparison and,
indeed, both figures have little meaning, unless augmented by material
on caseload composition, such as the appeals' complexity. The
percentages of oral arguments and published opinions are equally
unpersuasive without analogous supplementation. Similarly instructive
is the commissioners' decision to exclude senior appellate judges of the
particular circuit from "visiting judges" when counting how many threejudge panels included at least one visitor. 39 That determination should
enhance accuracy because senior appellate judges of the specific court
generally have greater familiarity with the circuit's law, traditions and
members, and more closely resemble its active judges, than panel
participants who have not served as active judges of the court. Another
example is much objective information which the Commission gathered
on the Ninth Circuit during the 1997 fiscal year. 40 The actual importance
of this material can be precisely calculated only by allowing for the fact
that the court functioned throughout the relevant period absent nearly
one-quarter of its active judges.41
" Id.; see also Working Papers, supra note 6, at 3-91.
38
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
39
See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 108 tbl.6a.
"' Seeid.at93-99, 100-13.
" See Final Report, supra note 1, at 30. See generally Carl Tobias, Filling The Federal
Appellate Openings on the Ninth Circuit, 19 REV. LmG. 233 (2000).
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Were these problems amenable to remediation or amelioration, certain
difficult, and perhaps intractable, complications would remain.
illustrative are the complexities entailed in defining and measuring the
related, rather esoteric ideas of appellate justice, effective appeals court
operation and the appellate ideal. The exercise may therefore implicate
normative value judgments. A useful definition of appellate justice, and
possibly of efficacious performance, which derives from Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure l, is the prompt, inexpensive and equitable resolution of
cases. 42
There is concomitantly some consensus that the appellate ideal means
merits-based disposition of each appeal after thorough briefing and oral
argument, close consultation among a panel comprising three active
appellate judges of the circuit, and the issuance of a published opinion
which comprehensively explains the conclusion reached. 43 This article
emphasizes appellate justice and effective operation because all three
concepts are inextricably intertwined. The first two concepts can
felicitously and fairly serve as surrogates for the appellate ideal, which is
more difficult to define and calculate. Federal Rule 1 specifically helps
give meaning to appellate justice, and a few of that construct's
constituents should accommodate objective measurement.
The
commissioners correspondingly appeared to employ as a standard
efficacious functioning, a notion which they seemed to consider
comparatively lenient and which is rather easily defined. 44
Even if the three concepts could be assigned clearer meaning, they are
relative terms whose application may depend on context and exacting
calibration, partly because burgeoning caseloads and finite resources
have transformed the courts and frustrated their efforts to deliver
appellate justice, to operate effectively and to realize the appellate ideal. 45
In comparing the circuits, therefore, evaluators must remember that
courts can deploy their limited funding differently to treat escalating
appeals and that these diverse ways of proceeding could be equally

" See FED. R. Crv. P. l; see also Patrick Johnston, Problems in Raising Prayers to the Level of
Rule: The Example of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, 75 B.U.L. REv. 1325 (1995); Carl Tobias,
The New Certiorari and a National Study of the Appeals Courts, 81 CORNELL L. R.Ev. 1264, 1286
n.90 (1996).
43
See, THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL - THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S.
COURTS OF APPEALS 14-30 (1994); MCKENNA, supra note 8, at 9-11; FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
REPORT, supra note 8, at 109.
" See, e.g., Final Report, supra note 1, at ix-xi, 29-30; see also infra. note 146.
" See BAKER, supra note 43, at 14-30, 287-302; Martha Dragich, Once a Century: Time for
a Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts of Appeals, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 1; Carl Tobias, Dear
Justice White, 30 ARiz. ST. L. J. 1127 (1998).
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acceptable. For instance, one circuit's judges may believe that they
perform best by affording some written explanation, however brief,
although the court publishes a relatively small percentage of opinions or
rather infrequently grants oral arguments. 46 The members of another
circuit might concomitantly think that they can work most efficaciously
by issuing comparatively few published opinions but hearing oral
arguments in a substantial percentage of cases.47 Thus, these, and
numerous additional, approaches to the resolution of increasing dockets
with relatively restricted resources may be satisfactory.
The Commission apparently recognized certain problems with the
objective and subjective criteria. For example, the commissioners were
not able to say that the objective "statistical criteria tip decisively in one
direction or the other. While there are differences among the courts of
appeals, differences in judicial vacancy rates, caseload mix, and
operating procedures make it impossible to attribute them to any single
factor such as size." 48 The Commission members also candidly admitted:
"In the time allotted, we could not possibly have undertaken a
statistically meaningful analysis of opinions as well as unpublished
dispositions, dissents, and petitions for rehearing en bane to make our
own objective determination of how the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
measures up to others." 49 The commissioners ultimately concluded that
"neither we nor, we believe, anyone else, can reduce consistency and
predictability to statistical analysis. These concepts are too subtle, the
decline in quality too incremental, and the effects of size too difficult to
isolate, to allow evaluation in a freeze-framed moment." 50
The
Commission did assert that "consistency and predictability have to do
with the coherence of the law declared over time" and that the appellate
process places a "premium on collegial deliberation," even as the entity
conceded that the idea of collegiality cannot be quantified or measured. 51
However, the commissioners offered their essentially unsupported

46
This apparently is the tradition in the Ninth Circuit. See Interview with Judge
Procter Hug, Jr., Chief Judge, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Las Vegas, Nev. (May 7,
1999) [hereinafter Hug Interview]; Interview with Judge Pamela Ann Rymer, Judge, Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, in D.C. (Mar. 20, 1998) [hereinafter Rymer Interview]; see also
Working Papers, supra note 6, at 93 tbl.3.
" This apparently is the tradition in the Second Circuit. See Interview with Judge Jose
Cabranes, Judge, Second Circuit of Appeals, in Las Vegas, Nev. (Jan. 21, 1999); see also
Working Papers, supra note 6, at 93 tbl.2.
48
Final Report, supra note 1, at 39.
" Id.
so Id at 40.
s1 Id.
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"judgment that the consistent, predictable, coherent development of the
law over time is best fostered in a decisional unit that is small enough for
the kind of close, continual, collaborative decision making that 'seeks the
objective of as much excellence in a group's decision as its combined
talents, experience and energy permit. "'52
Despite the complications delineated above, it is possible to compare
specific courts' operation in terms of the indicia on which the
Commission collected material and by providing for the difficulties
identified. The next subsection assesses how the First Circuit functioned
vis-a-vis the parameters for which the commissioners assembled
applicable, objective information by contrasting the court's efforts with
the national average and with the performance of other circuits. This
exercise is a useful illustration, although relatively little additional
benefit would be derived from reproducing similar raw data for all
twelve courts. 53 The analysis then affords a comparative snapshot of
those circuits, emphasizing the courts that appear to operate most and
least efficaciously, and offers additional insights on the individual
circuits.
2. The First Circuit as an illustration of Specific Courts
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is the smallest
appellate court, apart from the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, in terms of many applicable considerations.
Except for the D.C. Circuit, the First Circuit serves the smallest
population base (13.3 million individuals), exercises jurisdiction over the
tiniest land base (52,000 square miles), includes the fewest federal
districts (five), has the smallest number of active appellate (six) and
district (twenty-nine) judges, each year receives the least cases (1450) and
annually resolves the fewest appeals (1370). 54 In the 1997 fiscal year,

52
Id. (quoting FRANK COFFIN, ON APPEAL 215 (1994)); see also infra notes 148-49 and
accompanying text.
53
These data are rather readily accessible in the Final Report and Working Papers. See,
e.g., Final Report, supra note 1, at 14, 22, 24, 27; Working Papers, supra note 6, at 93-99. I
tersely treat the subjective material. See infra note 69. Much of it comprises personal
opinions and even that related to the Ninth Circuit is not very instructive. See infra note
120 and accompanying text.
54
See Final Report, supra note 1, at 27 tbl.2-9; see also id. (affording data for D.C.
Circuit). The D.C. Circuit is peculiar in several respects, especially the many appeals from
agency decisions that it hears. See CHRISTOPHER P. BANKS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN THE D.C.
CIRCUIT COURT (1999); Colloquy, The Contributions of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law,
40 ADMIN. L. REV. 507 (1988); Spottswood W. Robinson, ill, The D.C. Circuit: An Era of
Change, 55 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 715 (1987).
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members of the First Circuit decided 696 cases on the merits, which was
the lowest figure nationwide. 55 The court concomitantly terminated 116
appeals per authorized active judgeship on the merits as compared to the
national average of 155.56 Only the Tenth Circuit with 115 and the D.C.
Circuit with sixty-one resolved fewer cases per authorized judgeship. 57
During the 1997 fiscal year, judges of the First Circuit conducted oral
arguments in 61 percent of the appeals that the court decided on the
merits. 58 This statistic was substantially higher than the nationwide
average of 40 percent. It was eclipsed only in the Second Circuit and was
more than twice the percentage compiled by the Third, Fourth, Tenth
and Eleventh Circuits, which granted oral arguments in only 30 percent
of those courts' cases. 59
For the 1997 fiscal year, members of the First Circuit issued published
opinions in 51 percent of the appeals that the court resolved on the
merits.6() This figure was more than two times the national average of 23
percent and was greater than thrice the percentages which the Third,
Fourth and Eleventh Circuits compiled.61 In the 1997 fiscal year,
members of the First Circuit correspondingly terminated 32 percent of
the cases on the merits after oral argument. 62 This number was ten
percent larger than the system-wide average and double that of the
Third Circuit.6.3
During the 1997 fiscal year, 25 percent .0£ three-judge panels which
resolved cases after oral argument in the First Circuit included at least
one visiting appellate or district court judge. 64 This record was eight
percentage points below the national averag~, while 64 percent of panels
constituted by the Eleventh Circuit had a 'participant who was not an
active judge of the court. 65
0
Between the 1995 and 1997 fiscal years in the First Circuit, the median
time interval in counseled civil, non-prisoner cases that the court
terminated after hearing or submission was 8.9 months from the notice
See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 93 tbl.l.
See id.
57
See id.; see also supra note 54 and accompanying text (suggesting that D.C. Circuit's
docket may partially explain small number of cases that it terminated).
58
See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 93 tbl.2.
59
See id.
60
See id. at 93 tbl.3.
1
•
See id.
62
See id. at 94 tbl.5.
63
Seeid.
64
See id. at 108 tbl.6a.
65
See id.
55
56
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of appeal to final disposition.66 The system-wide average during this
period was 12.4 months, and the Ninth Circuit required 18.2 months,
although the First Circuit was slower than the national average in three
of the five parameters, which the Commission employed in evaluating
time to disposition. 67
Examination of all the material above suggests that the First Circuit
functions rather well. Illustrative is the large percentage of cases which
the court accords oral arguments and published opinions. Those are
important measures of appellate justice and effective operation. The
First Circuit substantially surpassed the national average in each area
and compiled percentages that were twice as high as some courts for oral
arguments and three times greater than other tribunals for published
opinions. 68 These statistics, which seemingly reflect the considerable
attention that the First Circuit devotes to most cases, may explain why
the court resolved so few appeals on the merits and decided a
comparatively small number of cases per authorized judgeship. 69 The
First Circuit also performed better than the national average for most of
the remaining categories. In short, the First Circuit appears to be
working relatively well.
3. Conclusions Regarding Specific Appeals Courts
a. A Comparison of How Specific Courts Perform
The discussion at the outset of this subsection assessed several
significant problems which complicate attempts to posit particularly
definitive conclusions respecting the operation of specific appellate
courts. 70 For example, the information that the Commission compiled
seemingly lacks certain qualities, such as sufficient comprehensiveness,
refinement, applicability and contextualization to support very certain
determinations.
Notwithstanding those difficulties, the circuits'
functioning can be examined vis-a-vis the parameters for which the
commissioners collected material and by allowing for the concerns

06

67

See id. at 95 tbl.7.
See id. Appeals and district court judges of the First Circuit as well as appellate

attorneys who responded to the Commission survey seemed relatively satisfied with the
consistency and predictability of circuit law as well as with the court's overall performance.
See, e.g., id. at 19-21, 23-24, 47.
68
See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
69
See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 35-56 and accompanying text.
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expressed earlier.
This comparison indicates that the First and Seventh Circuits
apparently performed best during the 1997 fiscal year. The First Circuit
terminated the largest percentage of appeals on the merits in which oral
argument was conducted and that resulted in published opinions,71
while the Seventh Circuit compiled the third and second highest
percentages respectively for these measures. 72 Indeed, the two courts
issued published opinions in more than twice the percentage of cases as
the national average and exceeded virtually all of the remaining courts. 73
The First Circuit also decided cases most quickly from the notice of
appeal to final disposition, 74 and a minuscule 1 percent of the panels
which the Seventh Circuit constituted included visiting participants. 75
Those are multiple, significant measures of whether courts dispense
appellate justice, operate efficaciously and realize the appellate ideal.
However, the two tribunals did not compile strong records in every
area on which the Commission gathered information. For instance, only
the D.C. and Tenth Circuits resolved fewer cases on the merits per
authorized judgeship than the First Circuit,76 and the Seventh Circuit
concluded appeals rather slowly in terms of several factors. 77 The figures
may explain how the two courts were able to afford so many published
opinions and why the First Circuit treated filings so expeditiously.
The comparison suggests that the Third, Fourth and Eleventh Circuits
seemingly performed least well during the 1997 fiscal year. The three
tribunals were among the four circuits deciding the smallest percentages
of cases on the merits in which there was oral argument78 and hearing the
biggest percentages of appeals in which at least one visiting judge
participated,79 while the three courts wrote the lowest percentages of
published opinions.80 In fact, the Third and Eleventh Circuits issued
fewer than one third the percentage of published opinions as the First

71
See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 93-94 tbls.2 & 5; see also supra notes 58-63 and
accompanying text.
12
See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 93-94 tbls.2 & 5; see also Chicago Council of
Lawyers, Evaluation of the United States Court of Appeals Joi the Seventh Circuit, 43 DEPAUL L.
REV. 673 (1994) (evaluating organization, principles, and judges of Seventh Circuit).
73
See id. at 93 tbl.2.
74
See id. at 95 tbl.7; see also supra text accompanying note 66.
" See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 108 tbl.6a.
1
See id. at 93 tbl. 1; see also supra text accompanying note 56.
•
77
See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 95 tbl.7.
" See id. at 93 tbl.2; see also id. (showing that Tenth Circuit was fourth court).
79
See id. at 108 tbl. 6a; see also id. (showing that Ninth Circuit was fourth court).
"' See id. at 93 tbl.3.
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Circuit. 81 The Fourth Circuit published less than one-quarter of that
court's percentage, while the Eleventh Circuit employed visitors at a rate
which was essentially double the nationwide average. 82 The indicia are
important yardsticks for ascertaining whether courts deliver appellate
justice, function effectively and achieve the appellate ideal.
The three tribunals did operate rather efficaciously vis-a-vis certain
parameters. For example, the Third and Fourth Circuits were among the
courts that most promptly resolved cases in terms of a few factors. 83 The
low percentages of oral arguments and published opinions as well as the
large number of visiting participants reported above might explain how
the tribunals were able to terminate appeals with relative expedition ..
The Eleventh Circuit also concluded substantially more cases on the
merits per authorized judgeship than all eleven of the courts: its figure
was 275, the Fifth Circuit was second with 202 and the national average
was 155.84 However, the Eleventh Circuit statistic could mean that these
appeals received relatively little attention from appellate judges of the
court. The Eleventh Circuit staffs panels with the highest percentage of
visiting participants - 64, a figure which nearly doubles the system-wide
average and which is 21 percentage points greater than the next closest
court - and has the second biggest complement of staff attomeys. 85
It is ironic that a majority of the active members on the Third, Fourth
and Eleventh Circuits have publicly urged Congress not to authorize
additional judgeships for the courts. 86 The jurists have so importuned
lawmakers, even though the measures, involving conservative estimates
of appellate caseloads and judicial resources, which the Judicial
Conference employs to recommend judgeships for the circuits, may
show that these courts need more judges.87

See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 60.
See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 108 tbl.6a.
83
See id. at 95 tbl.7.
" See id. at 93 tbl.1; see also supra notes 58-59 (showing courts with fewest
'

1

82

terminations).
85
See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 108 tbl.6a; Final Report, supra note 1, at 24 tbl.28. A high percentage of pro se cases could also explain the statistic; however, a few other
circuits receive larger percentages and absolute numbers of pro se appeals. See Working
Papers, supra note 6, at 93 tbl.1.
86
See Carl Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges in the Second Clinton Administration, 23
HAsTINGS CONST. L. Q. 741, 749 (1997); Tobias, supra note 12, at 1362.
87
See Tobias, supra note 86, at 753. But see Charles E. Grassley, Chairman's Report on the
Appropriate Allocation of Judgeships in the United States Courts of Appeals 2-7 (1999); J. Harvie
Wilkinson, ill, The Drawbacks of Growth in the Federal Judiciary, 43 EMORY L. J. 1147, 1161-63
(1994); but cf Appointment of Additional Federal Circuit and District Judges, S.1145, 106th
Cong. (1999) (proposing no new positions for three courts).
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The comparison indicates that the Ninth and Tenth Circuits
apparently performed second worst. For instance, the Ninth Circuit
issued the fourth smallest percentage of published opinions,88 decided
cases most slowly from notice of appeal to final disposition89 and
resolved the second highest percentage of cases with visiting judges.90
The Tenth Circuit correspondingly tied the Third, Fourth and Eleventh
Circuits for the lowest percentage of appeals terminated on the merits
after oral argument91 as well as the Fourth and Fifth Circuits for the
second smallest percentage of cases concluded on the merits with oral
argument,92 while the court was second only to the D.C. Circuit in least
appeals decided on the merits per authorized judgeship. 93 Nonetheless,
each court worked rather well in other respects. The Ninth Circuit was
one of the quicker courts in terms of two factors which calculate time to
disposition. 94
Even when all of the information that the commissioners accumulated
is considered together, it remains very difficult to conclude definitively
whether specific circuits deliver appellate justice, function efficaciously
or attain the appellate ideal, much less to identify measures which would
clearly improve the courts. Although it may be impossible to determine
with certainty that any regional circuit is not dispensing appellate justice,
performing effectively or realizing the appellate ideal, the material above
suggests that some courts seemingly work better than others and can
support tentative recommendations regarding approaches which might
enhance circuit operations. For example, an infusion of resources would
apparently benefit those appeals courts that the comparison indicates do
not function well. More specifically, the authorization of several
additional judgeships for the Third, Fourth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits
should enable each court to provide higher percentages of oral
arguments and published opinions, to resolve cases more promptly, and
to depend less substantially on visiting judges.95

See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 93 tbl.3.
"' See id. at 95 tbl.7.
90
See id. at 108 tbl.6a; see also Final Report, supra note 1, at 30 (suggesting that court

88

may only have been able to operate this well because of contributions made by senior
judges).
1
•
See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 93 tbl.2.
92
See id. at 94 tbl.5.
93
See id. at 93 tbl.1.
94
See id. at 95 tbl.7.
95
See supra notes 78-94 and accompanying text; infra notes 128-29, 160-61 and
accompanying text. The resources should increase litigants' procedural opportunities and
the justice delivered. Reduced reliance on visitors might address concerns about decreased
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4. Other Insights on Specific Courts
The information which the Commission gathered also affords
instructive insights on particular appeals courts at the millennium.
Much of this material confirms, reinforces or clarifies ideas that prior
studies had elucidated. For instance, one informative analysis which the
Commission authorized validated findings in the 1993 assessment
performed by the Federal Judicial Center, even as the new examination
did challenge some widely held views about appellate caseloads.% The
evaluation determined that more filings in a few case types, rather than
"broad increases in the willingness to appeal" have driven considerable
docket growth, while the study found that upward drift, not a steep rise,
characterized the trend in appeal rates and that there was no evident
association between these rates and circuit size. 97
The
Commission
description
correspondingly
enhances
comprehension of the appellate courts by reaffirming certain
conventional wisdom related to the tribunals. For example, practically
all of the circuits continue experiencing the caseload expansion which
has transformed them over the last generation, employing diverse
approaches when attempting to resolve appeals with insufficient
resources and furnishing diminished procedural opportunities.98 Some
variation does exist among the appellate courts, nonetheless. For
instance, there are differences in terms of cases' complexity and the
concomitant percentages of pro se filings; the rates at which dockets
increase in the circuits; and the numbers of judges and administrative
personnel as well as the facilities and related support that the courts
have. 99
One clear impression which emerges from consulting the information
that the Commission compiled is the diverse, and frequently creative,
responses which the regional circuits have invoked to decide mounting
appeals with comparatively scarce resources. Almost every court
intracircuit consistency and collegiality that the Commission implicitly ascribed to Ninth
Circuit dependence on visitors. See Final Report, supra note 1, at 39-40, 47-48.
,. See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 127; see also MCKENNA, supra note 8 (affording
earlier assessment).
"' See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 133; see also id. at ii (listing other studies that
Commission on Structural Alternatives commissioned, most of which are less relevant to
this article) ). See generally CAROL l<RAFKA ET AL., STALKING THE INCREASE IN THE RATE OF
CIVIL APPEALS (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1993).
98
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
"' See, e.g., MCKENNA, supra note 8, at 31-32; Final Report, supra note 1, at 16 tbls.2-4 &
2-5; at 24 tbl.2-8; at 27 tbl.2-9; Carl Tobias, Some Cautions About Structural Overhaul of the
Federal Courts, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 389, 395 (1997).
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addresses docket growth by relying on visiting judges and circuit staff,
reducing the percentages of oral arguments and published opinions
provided, using appellate management techniques and by employing a
broad spectrum of other mechanisms. 100 Yet, most of the appeals courts
differ, often significantly, in their deployment of these measures.
For example, in the 1997 fiscal year, 64 percent of Eleventh Circuit
three-judge panels included at least one visiting participant, while the
D.C. Circuit so comprised no panels. 101 During this period, the Second
Circuit heard oral arguments in 65 percent of the court's cases, even as
the Third, Fourth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits entertained oral
arguments in only 30 percent of their appeals. 102 Moreover, the First
Circuit published opinions in one-half of the court's cases, but the Fourth
Circuit wrote published opinions for a mere 11 percent of its appeals and
four other tribunals did so in fewer than 19 percent.103
Appellate courts also differ widely in terms of the criteria that they
apply in deciding whether to issue a published opinion, the weight
which the tribunals accord published and unpublished determinations
and the requirements that govern litigants' citation to unpublished
dispositions. 104 The circuits correspondingly invoke a plethora of
measures in managing cases. For example, every court screens filings,
principally to ascertain appeals' relative complexity and the concomitant
procedural treatment which the cases will receive. 105 In three circuits,
judges undertake this duty, and the remaining courts assign central staff,
employees in the clerk's office or the Circuit Executive the screening
function. 106 All of the courts correspondingly rely on various alternatives
to dispute resolution ("ADR"), but the options assume diverse forms.
More circuits employ mediation or conference programs and a few
courts use arbitration, while circuit staff have primary responsibility for

100
See Final Report, supra note 1, at 21-25. See generally MCKENNA, supra note 8, at 3853; Grassley, supra note 87, at 8-10.
101
See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 108 tbl.6a; see also Final Report, supra note 1, at
24 tbl.2-8 (showing disparities in circuit reliance on staff).
102
See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 93 tbl.2.
103
See id. at tbl.3. The Third, Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits published opinions for
fewer than 19 percent of their appeals. See id.
104
See id. at 110-16; see also Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60
OHIO ST. L. J. 177 (1999) (affording thorough exposition of these differences).
105
See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 102-04). See generally MCKENNA, supra note 8, at
40-42; UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT, CIVIL APPEALS
MANAGEMENT PLAN (1999).
106
See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 104 tbl.2); see generally BAKER, supra note 43, at
135-47; Tobias, supra note 7, at 230.
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the administration of these alternatives in most courts. 107

B. Additional Lessons
Numerous, other helpful lessons can be derived from the descriptive
account that the Commission developed in compiling its report and
suggestions. This section initially emphasizes a number of perspectives
on the commissioners' work, and then explores several additional ideas,
which may be gleaned from the description.
l. Lessons From the Commission Work

Certain observations below are implicitly mentioned throughout my
earlier examination. The Commission probably achieved all that could
be expected during the exceedingly short time that Congress prescribed.
Lawmakers provided the entity twelve months for studying the entire
appellate system and for writing its report and recommendations. 108 One
year was an extremely brief time-frame to complete an enormous
assignment. For instance, some appeals courts require a longer period to
resolve cases than the commissioners had for assessing the circuits. 1()')
The compressed time frame essentially precluded the systematic
collection, analysis and synthesis of considerable empirical data on how
the courts address specific appeals from filing to disposition.
This temporal constraint might indicate why the information which
the commissioners did assemble cannot support particularly definitive
conclusions respecting individual circuits or the appellate system. Most
of that material, especially the information which ostensibly underlies
the Commission decision making, seemingly lacks important attributes,
namely
the
requisite
comprehensiveness,
refinement
or
"" See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 102. See generally JAMES B. EAGLIN, THE PREARGUMENT CONFERENCE PROGRAM IN Tiffi SIXrn CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS: AN
EVALUATION (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1990); ROBERT NIEMIC, MEDIATION AND CONFERENCE
PROGRAMS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1997). Some circuit-specific
empirical and other relevant material included in the Commission description might apply
to the appellate system. However, the description's implications for that system warrant
minimal analysis here principally because much systemic information lacks applicable
measures for comparison that are analogous to those used in contrasting circuit-specific
objective data. Little of that data or certain subjective Commission information were, or
can be, computed systemically. Examples are the national averages. Even this material
must be compared with previously assembled information, much of which is unrelated to
the Commission study.
"" See Department of Justice Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, §
305(a)(l)(B), 111Stat.2491 (1997).
109
See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
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contextualization, that would permit very conclusive determinations.
The above ideas may explain the fundamental deficiencies in the
Commission's work. Those problems are the failure to identify the exact
aspects of Ninth Circuit operations, which prompted the Commission's
recommendation of the divisional arrangement, and how this approach
would constitute improvement. More specifically, the Commission
members did not answer with clarity three questions. First, the
Commission did not answer how a court must perform to be working
inefficaciously and, thus, warrant remediation. Second, the Commission
did not explicate precisely why it found that the Ninth Circuit so
functions. Third, the Commission did not show expressly how the
solution proposed would rectify any inadequacies detected and enhance
the court's operations. Despite these complications, lessons can be
extracted from the commissioners' effort by examining what they
actually said, by drawing reasonable inferences from the material which
the Commission gathered and the suggestions which it proffered. It is
also informative to assume that the Commission collected sufficient
empirical data, which demonstrates that the Ninth Circuit operates
ineffectively enough to justify treatment and that the reform prescribed
would be responsive.
The commissioners apparently relied on several perceptions for their
central recommendations that Congress require the Ninth Circuit to
institute a divisional organization and authorize the remaining appeals
courts to adopt divisional structures when they exceed a particular size.
The Commission seemingly believed that appellate courts, which have
more than fifteen active judges, experience difficulty maintaining
uniform, coherent and predictable circuit law as well as judicial
collegiality. 110
The commissioners apparently thought that these
circumstances prevail in the Ninth Circuit, which has twenty-eight active
members; that the tribunal's limited en bane mechanism undermines
consistency, coherence and predictability; and that the court's gigantic
geographic magnitude erodes the positive features of regionalism. 111
However, the Commission did not clearly articulate those ideas. Most
of what it explicitly stated, especially regarding the existence of the
phenomena above, lacked sufficient empirical verification, and the
entity provided few specific findings about the Ninth Circuit's condition.
For example, the commissioners frankly admitted that they had

110
See Final Report, supra note 1, at iii, ix-xi, 29-30, 47-49; see also supra text
accompanying note 49. See generally Hellman, supra note 4, at 393-401.
111
See Final Report, supra note 1, at 30-31, 35-41, 50-53.

2000]

Federal Appeals Courts at Century's End

571

inadequate time for conducting a statistically meaningful analysis of
Ninth Circuit decision making to reach an objective determination of
how the court compares with others. The commissioners eventually
concluded that uniformity and predictability defy statistical evaluation. 112
Nonetheless, the comrmss10ners essentially depended on their
unsubstantiated, personal judgments for the critical proposition that the
"consistent, predictable, coherent development of the law over time is
best fostered in a decisional unit that is small enough" to be collegial.113
The commissioners acknowledged that this notion "cannot be quantified
or measured." 114 The Commission concomitantly asserted that the
divisional concept would promote uniform, coherent and predictable
circuit law, judicial collegiality and regional linkages,115 but those
contentions were almost exclusively justificatory and were nearly devoid
of empirical support. Indeed, there was no showing that the divisional
proposal, which appeals courts have never applied, would improve the
situations of the Ninth Circuit or the remaining courts. Insofar as these
perceptions actually animated the divisional scheme, the ideas on which
the commissioners seemingly depended the most received the least
empirical substantiation.
The Commission report and working papers included additional
material which undercut, and even contravened, the Commission's
recommendations. The commissioners explicitly observed that they
found none of the circuits functions inefficaciously, much less fails to
deliver justice. 116 After canvassing "all of the available objective data
routinely used in court administration to measure [circuit] performance
and efficiency," the Commission could not say that these "statistical
criteria tip decisively in one direction or the other." 117 The Commission
stated that "while there are differences among the courts of appeals,
differences in judicial vacancy rates, caseload mix, and operating
procedures make it impossible to attribute them to any single factor such
as size." 118 Indeed, several important indicia - the percentages of oral
arguments and published opinions afforded as well as the number of
dispositions per authorized judgeship - on which the commissioners

112
113

See id. at 39; see also supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
Final Report, supra note 1, at 40.

11
•
Id.(stating that commissioners made "no attempt to do so" for any circuit); see supra
text accompanying notes 50-51 (elaborating textual ideas).
115
See Final Report, supra note 1, at iii, 47-50.
11
•
See id. at 29; see also supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
117
Final Report, supra note 1, at 39
11
•
Id.; see also supra notes 36, 48 and accompanying text.

University of California, Davis

572

[Vol. 34:549

collected objective, empirical data specifically suggest that the Ninth
Circuit performs better than numerous other courts. 119 However, the
Commission apparently ignored these figures, as witnessed by the
minimal discussion accorded them in the Commission's report. A few
admissions related to the subjective information which the
commissioners consulted are practically as revealing. Most crucial was
the Commission members' candid acknowledgement: "when all is said
and done [no one] can reduce consistency and predictability to statistical
analysis. These concepts are too subtle, the decline in quality too
incremental, and the effects of size too difficult to isolate, to allow
evaluation in a freeze-framed moment." 120 The survey conducted by the
Commission correspondingly showed that Ninth Circuit district judges
"report finding the law insufficiently clear to give them confidence in
their decisions on questions of law about as often as their counterparts in
other circuits. "121
In short, the Commission assembled some objective, empirical data
and relatively little subjective material. However, the Commission did
not designate exactly how an appellate court must operate to function
ineffectively and, therefore, deserve remediation. The commissioners
also delineated with little clarity why they decided that the Ninth Circuit
performs so inefficaciously as to require treatment, and how the
divisional approach would improve any deficiencies found. Vague,
unsupported generalizations, subjective perceptions and personal
opinions cannot replace empirical data that have been systematically
gathered, assessed and synthesized.
In fairness, the severe time restraints under which the Commission
labored may explain the Commission's collection of minimal empirical
information and its substantial reliance on subjective material. The
serious time restraints might concomitantly indicate why the
Commission report includes several, significant findings that seem to
For example, the
contradict the entity's recommendations.
commissioners' conclusion that all appeals courts operate effectively and
22
their corresponding rejection of circuit-splitting for any of the courts,1
contradicts the commissioners' apparent belief that the Ninth Circuit

See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 93 tbls.1-3.
Final Report, supra note 1, at 40; see also supra text accompanying note 50.
121
See Final Report, supra note 1, at 39-40. The judges do have certain problems with
"inconsistencies between published and unpublished opinions," while "lawyers in the
Ninth Circuit report somewhat more difficulty discerning circuit law and predicting
outcomes" than attorneys elsewhere. Id.
122
See id. at iii, ix-xi, 29.
11

•

120
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works less efficaciously than the court could because the commissioners
proposed a solution which would essentially divide the circuit.
Certain determinations discussed previously also are difficult to make
and may well resist particularly precise empirical verification. For
instance, assembling empirical data on the divisional arrangement, let
alone demonstrating its effectiveness, would have been virtually
impossible because no appellate court has implemented the concept.
Nearly as problematic are the efforts to define, detect and measure the
inconsistency, incoherence, and unpredictability of circuit law, the lack
of judicial collegiality and, if any of the attributes exists, ascertaining
definitively whether judicial collegiality correlates with a court's size.
Equally vexing is the concomitant attempt to pinpoint confidently the
optimal number of active judgeships for a regional circuit. That inquiry,
which seemed integral to the Commission's suggestions, 123 implicates a
diverse mix of comparatively abstract phenomena that can vary among
the courts and across time. These factors include the aforementioned
uniformity, coherence, predictability and judicial collegiality; local legal
culture, traditions and practices; judicial reliance on circuit staff; as well
as the meaning of appellate justice and opinions about how best to
deliver justice. Indeed, the judges of the appeals courts vociferously
disagree over this issue and have participated in vigorous, ongoing
debate related to size. 124 For example, most current members of the
Ninth Circuit believe that the court performs efficaciously with twentyeight active judges, and some even declare publicly that it would
function as well having a larger judicial complement. 125 In sharp
contrast, a majority of active members on the Third, Fourth and Eleventh
Circuits has officially urged Congress to authorize no additional
judgeships for their courts. 126 Finally, it is important to remember the
mid-1970s recommendation by the Hruska Commission, which
conducted a comprehensive study of the circuits, and the Judicial
Conference, the policymaking arm of the federal courts, that nine be the

See supra notes 110-111, 114 and accompanying text.
"' Compare Jon 0. Newman, 1000 Judges-The Limit for an Effective Judiciary, 76
JUDICATURE 187 (1993) with Stephen Reinhardt, Too Few Judges, Too Many Cases: A Plea to
Save the Federal Courts, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52. See generally GoROON BERMANT ET AL.,
123

lMPosING A MORATORIUM ON THE NUMBER OF FEDERAL JUDGES: ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS
AND IMPLICATIONS (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1993), available at http://www.fjc.gov/JUDJUDACT I
impomora/ impomora.pdf.
125
See Tobias, supra note 7, at 1364; Reinhardt, supra note 124; Hug Interview, supra note
46.
126
See supra note 86 and accompanying text; see also LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 8, at
44.
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maximum number for a circuit. The suggestion is a trenchant reminder
of how dramatically the increase in caseloads has altered modern
thinking about the appellate courts and transformed them because today
eleven of the twelve regional circuits have at least twelve active judges. 128
The complexity of these determinations are not underestimated.
Despite the significant complications entailed, evaluators could secure
considerably better data than the Commission accumulated and
correspondingly posit more definitive conclusions about whether and, if
so, why any appeals court operates ineffectively enough to warrant
remediation as well as identify responsive solutions.129 Professor Arthur
Hellman's careful, decade-long work which involves intracircuit
consistency typifies the type of meticulous effort that evaluators might
undertake. 130 A recent study by Professor Tracey George of three
appellate courts' reliance on the en bane device concomitantly shows
how to analyze use of this measure in other tribunals and indicates how
to evaluate Ninth Circuit employment of the limited en bane technique. 131
The examinations of the appellate system which the Federal Judicial
Center finished during 1993 and that the Hruska Commission completed
a quarter century ago illustrate the kind of comprehensive, refined
assessment which I envision. 132

127
See Hruska Commission, supra note 26, at 231-32; JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. 48 (1974). In
fairness, the courts began experiencing the docket growth that transformed them in the
1970s. See supra text accompanying note 30.
128
See Final Report, supra note 1, at 27 tbl.2-9.
129
It is important to appreciate that even some commission material, such as raw data
on dockets, which is useful, would benefit from refinement and specificity, while
evaluators will need to collect, analyze and synthesize much supplemental or new
empirical data. See infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
130
See, e.g., Arthur D. Hellman, Maintaining Consistency in the I.aw of the Large Circuit, in
RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE 55-90 (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990); Arthur D. Hellman, Breaking
the Banc: The Common-Law Process in the Large Appellate Court, 23 ARiz. ST. L.J. 915 (1991)
[hereinafter Hellman, Breaking the Banc]; Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence:
The Theory and Practice of Precedent in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 541 (1989)
[hereinafter Hellman, Jumboism]. The book REsTRUCTURING JUSTICE is essentially a study.
See infra note 134.
131
See Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant En Banc
Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213 (1999). See generally Douglas H. Ginsburg & Donald Falk, The
Court En Banc: 1981-1990, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REY. 1008 (1991); Michael Solimine, Ideology and
En Banc Review, 67 N.C.L. REY. 29 (1988). There are two recent, similar studies of the
Fourth Circuit. See J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment of Judges
at the Court of Appeals, 78 TEX. L. REv. 1037, 1111 (2000); Phil Zarone, Agenda Setting on the
Courts of Appeals: The Effect of Ideology on En Banc Rehearings, 2 J. APP. PRACT. & PROC. 157
(2000).
132
See MCKENNA, supra note 8; Hruska Commission, supra note 26. Even the FJC study
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Finally, the Commission's endeavors demonstrate that those who
perform future analyses of the circuits must have adequate resources,
especially temporal ones, if the work is to support conclusive
determinations respecting the appeals courts and important public
policymaking which significantly affects the tribunals.
The
commissioners' efforts suggest that they had insufficient time to
complete the substantial assignment, even though Congress budgeted
ample monetary resources.
This paper does not criticize the
Commission, which apparently achieved as much as is reasonable to
expect in the limited period available. However, the Commission might
have expended the generous financial resources which Congress
provided differently.
For instance, the Commission could have
deployed legal scholars to conduct empirical evaluations that involved
uniformity, coherence, predictability, collegiality and regionalism.
a. Miscellany of Lessons
Additional lessons which implicate the commissioners' work
somewhat less directly can be derived from the Commission's
descriptive account of the twelve regional circuits. This description
enhances understanding of individual appellate courts.
The
Commission's descriptive account simultaneously teaches how little
even astute federal courts observers actually understand, and how much
more lawmakers, the federal judiciary and the nation need to know,
about particular circuits and the courts as a whole at the century's end.
This is true, although the Commission's study is the fourth important
assessment that encompassed the circuits during the last decade, and
there have been approximately fifteen analyses of these courts since the
1970s.
One valuable means by which the commissioners' description
improves appreciation is confirming the conventional wisdom related to
the circuits. 133 For example, the Commission's descriptive account
reaffirms that the appellate courts continue to have rather scarce
resources for confronting increased appeals, which they resolve in
myriad ways. The circuits specifically apply numerous, innovative
measures when attempting to deliver justice, to function efficaciously

was rather narrow, albeit broader than the other two major analyses in the last decade
because they did not emphasize the circuits. See FEDERAL COURTS STIJDY REPORT, supra
note 8; LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 8; see also infra note 141 and accompanying text
(mentioning thorough, refined study of federal districts).
133
See supra text accompanying note 98.
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and to attain the appellate ideal. However, the courts accord lawyers
and litigants fewer procedural opportunities, especially in the form of
oral arguments and published opinions.
The Commission's description enhances comprehension of local legal
culture, a construct which evaluators have heretofore employed
principally in scrutinizing criminal law and trial courts.134 For instance,
the descriptive account indicates that individual circuits follow certain
practices and traditions, particularly to address multiplying dockets
promptly, inexpensively and fairly with deficient funding. More
specifically, those courts, such as the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, which
have larger caseloads, rely substantially on visiting judges and on nonjudicial court personnel. Other circuits, namely the D.C and Seventh
Circuits, practically never depend on visiting judges and may employ
staff less. 135 The Second Circuit correspondingly hears oral arguments in
a high percentage of appeals, including many cases which pro se
litigants pursue, while the First and Seventh Circuits write published
opinions in a significant percentage of appeals. 136 These propositions
might mean that the notion of local legal culture has greater applicability
to the appellate courts than some observers previously thought.
Certain aspects of the Commission's descriptive account show that the
idea of the regional circuit could have declining relevance, although the
commissioners partially premised the divisional recommendation on
their concern that the Ninth Circuit maintains inadequate linkages with
the geographic areas which it serves. 137 For example, manifestations of
the regional circuit's decreasing applicability are expanding
internationalization, increasing reliance on computerization by every
appeals court and on visiting appellate and district judges by most
tribunals, as well as growing tensions between the notions of
regionalism and federalization - the circuit duty to reconcile federal law
with local policies. 138

1
"
See Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy: Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DuKE
L.J. 929, 945-47 (1996); Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying the
Regional Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 603, 614 (1989); Carl Tobias,
Civil Justice Reform Sunset, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 527, 602-03. See generally THOMAS W.
CHURCH ET AL., JUSTICE DELAYEO: THE PACE OF LmGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS (1978).
135
See Final Report, supra note 1, at 24 tbl.2-8; Working Papers, supra note 6, at 108
tbl.6a; see also supra note 101 and accompanying text.
136
See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 93 tbl.2 (dealing with oral arguments), tbl.3
(dealing with published opinions); supra notes 46,47,74-75, 102, 106 and accompanying text;
see also George, supra note 131 (suggesting how circuits use en bane measure).
137
See Final Report, supra note 1, at 36, 49-50; see also Spreng, supra note 4, at 571-76.
138
See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHf, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 10-13 (5th ed. 1994); John
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In sum, the above analysis of the Commission's description indicates
that particular courts may be operating less effectively than they could.
However, the empirical data which the Commission collected cannot
support definitive conclusions respecting the circuits' present
circumstances or the Commission's proposals, most importantly the
divisional concept. The last section, accordingly, offers suggestions for
the future that members of Congress and the federal appellate judiciary
should carefully evaluate.
III.

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE

FUTURE

There are several reasons why the recommendations which lawmakers
and judges ought to consider deserve relatively little examination in this
article. First and foremost, the evidence adduced by the commissioners
does not permit very conclusive determinations about individual courts
and, thus, precise suggestions for future action. Second, even if the
information that the Commission elicited might yield more certain
findings related to specific circuits, numerous recommendations have
been rather comprehensively explored elsewhere. 139 Nevertheless, the
material which the commissioners assembled - especially together with
insights derived from prior assessments, such as the three major efforts
during the last decade140 - can allow some suggestions that complement
or elaborate the recommendations proffered earlier. The prescriptions
below implicate additional study, which could provide more definitive
conclusions about the appeals courts, continuing and new
experimentation with mechanisms that have been, or may prove,
efficacious, and a miscellany of other suggestions which might improve
the circuits.
The analysis throughout this article demonstrates that Congress
should not adopt the centerpiece of the Commission recommendations.
The commissioners produced insufficient empirical data which clearly
show that the current condition of any appellate court is troubling
enough to deserve remediation, particularly with a solution which could
be as disruptive as the untested divisional arrangement appears. Indeed,
the Commission frankly admitted that it found that all of the circuits
perform effectively.

Minor Wisdom, Requiem for a Great Court, 26 LoY. L. REv. 787, 788 (1980).
,,. See, e.g., Hug, supra note 3, at 908-09; Spreng, supra note 4, at 586-98; Tobias, supra
note 4, at 313-18.
0
"
See sources cited supra note 8.
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These propositions might lead Congress and the appeals courts to
exercise caution, but the ideas do not necessarily mean that legislators or
appellate judges must avoid all action. For instance, consideration of the
Commission information, in combination with previously gathered
material, may enable lawmakers to prescribe greater study;
experimentation with salutary measures, including some Commission
proposals; and additional constructive approaches.
The courts'
consultation of the information in the sentence above, closer examination
of their own situations, and increased exploration of the remaining
courts' circumstances, especially efficacious responses by tribunals to
docket growth, could concomitantly enhance circuit operations. For
example, appeals courts might modify the practices which they presently
follow, test or implement potentially effective mechanisms. In the end,
Congress and the appellate judiciary may simply lack the knowledge
that they need to institute action which is more ambitious than
continued study and selective experimentation.
A. Additional Study

1. An Introductory Word
There will never be perfect information on the federal intermediate
appeals courts. Nonetheless, evaluators could collect, scrutinize and
synthesize empirical data that are superior to the material which the
Commission accumulated. Superior data should permit more certain
determinations regarding the regional circuits. However, evaluators
must have adequate resources, particularly time, to perform rigorous
analysis by carefully structuring study and by assembling, examining
and synthesizing the requisite empirical data which will yield
sufficiently definitive conclusions. Evaluators should also consult and
capitalize upon the Commission's contributions and prior endeavors,
especially the ones that the commissioners essentially continued. These
prior efforts afford considerable, helpful information and numerous,
instructive perspectives on the appellate courts and on the conduct of
future work. An expert, independent entity, such as the RAND
Corporation, which recently completed a comprehensive assessment of
expense and delay reduction procedures in 94 federal districts, 141 should

s.

141
See, e.g., JAMES KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT
UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT IN PrLoT AND COMPARISON DISTRICTS (1996); JAMES S.
KAKALIK ET AL., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT IN PILar AND
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have primary responsibility for this activity. All twelve circuits might
correspondingly undertake introspection while drawing upon the
experiences in other appeals courts. For instance, Chief Judge Hug
appointed a Ninth Circuit Evaluation Committee to reconsider
numerous dimensions of the court's performance in light of the
Commission report and proposals and to develop constructive
suggestions for improvement. 142
2. Specific Suggestions
Evaluators must carefully gather, analyze and synthesize the
maximum empirical data which will permit them to ascertain as
conclusively as possible whether any circuit does not deliver appellate
justice, operate efficaciously or attain the appellate ideal. 143 Of course,
evaluators should allow for the possibility that every appeals courts now
works effectively, a finding which the commissioners expressly made,
even though the commissioners prescribed a divisional arrangement for
the Ninth Circuit. If the evaluators definitively determine that a court is
deficient, they must attempt to identify exactly why this situation came
about and to designate the best approaches for rectifying or ameliorating
the problems detected. In short, evaluators should essentially finish the
ongoing inquiry which the commissioners continued.
The Commission endeavor might serve as a starting point. However,
evaluators must institute numerous, additional efforts if they are to
complete the project that the Commission started. Most of the empirical
data which the commissioners systematically collected, examined and
synthesized will be helpful, but evaluators should scrutinize some of this
data and additional material. Insofar as evaluators find that the
information is insufficient, evaluators will need to particularize or refine
it, or assemble, analyze and synthesize supplemental or new empirical
data.
The raw numerical material on dockets is a general example of
information which may require refinement. The total number of cases

COMPARISON COURTS (1996); see also Tobias, supra note 134 at 602.
142
See Oversight Hearings on the Final Report of the Commission on Structural Alternatives

for the Federal Courts of Appeals Before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and
Intellectual Property (July 22, 1999) (statement of Judge David Thompson, Judge, Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals) [hereinafter Oversight Hearings]; Ninth Circuit Evaluation
Committee, Interim Report (Mar. 2000) [hereinafter Interim Report].
,., I emphasize appellate justice and efficacious operation for the reasons stated supra
notes 42-44 and accompanying text. These suggestions are primarily meant for expert,
independent evaluators, but specific courts can also apply them.
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that each regional circuit receives and processes is somewhat useful.
However, it would be instructive to know more about the filings'
relative complexity, beyond how many appeals prose litigants pursue. 144
Evaluators could concomitantly augment the material which the
commissioners collected on the absolute quantity of cases that every
appellate court accords en bane rehearing by. For instance, ascertaining
reconsideration's frequency and whether it suffices to maintain
consistency, coherence and predictability. 145 Evaluators might also
develop new empirical data on collegiality and regionalism with, for
example, interviews of judges. 146
Evaluators must determine as conclusively as possible whether any of
the regional circuits fails to provide appellate justice or to operate
efficaciously. Evaluators, accordingly, should delineate precisely how a
court must function by examining specified indicia to determine with
confidence that the circuit performs in an unsatisfactory manner, thereby
triggering remediation. This is a polycentric problem which will require
a carefully calibrated qualitative and quantitative analysis as well as the
exercise of discerning judgment.
The objective criteria can be treated rather felicitously because the raw
numerical data offer a readily available standard of comparison. For
instance, relevant information on every court could be considered with
reference to the national average and the operations of the remaining
circuits. However, these efforts must be contextualized. They will only
be valuable, to the extent that evaluators similarly calculate the
numerical material by identifying, isolating and allowing for applicable
variables. illustrative are the percentages of oral arguments and
published opinions afforded as well as disposition times, which resist
meaningful comparison absent provision for case complexity.
Once evaluators have placed this information in context, they must
confront additional, difficult issues. For example, exactly how small a
percentage of oral arguments or published opinions is too few and
precisely how long an appeals process is too inexpeditious? Evaluators
might answer these questions by comparing a particular appeals court's
,.. See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 93 tbl.1; supra text accompanying note 38. It
would also be beneficial to know more precisely which types of cases receive oral
arguments and published opinions and how courts deploy staff, manage appeals and use
ADR. See supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
5
"
See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 94 tbl.6. For more analysis of these ideas, see
infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
146
For more analysis of these ideas, see infra notes 148-49, 158 and accompanying text.
They as well might develop supplemental or new data on consistency, coherence and
predictability. See infra notes 147, 153-57 and accompanying text.
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record with the national average and the endeavors of the other eleven
circuits. The system-wide average could serve as a benchmark or
threshold for closer analysis, while a performance that is substantially
less than the national average or that is in the bottom quartile of
appellate courts might necessitate further inquiry.
At this juncture, evaluators should ask two questions: 1) exactly how
should a circuit function; and (2) what number of which types of
parameters would enable assessors' to ascertain confidently whether a
circuit is deficient. These determinations will require finely tuned
qualitative and quantitative consideration of relevant indicia as well as
identification of the reasons for any inadequacies found. The qualitative
aspect of the exercise would involve, for instance, how a court works
with reference to the remaining circuits and the relative significance of
individual criteria. More specifically, a court which compiles numerical
records that are much lower than most circuits in terms of factors, such
as the percentages of oral arguments or published opinions, which are
important to appellate justice, will deserve additional scrutiny. The
quantitative dimension would implicate, for example, the way that a
court operates compared to the other circuits in terms of certain factors.
More particularly, a court whose numbers are strikingly worse than a
majority of circuits for numerous factors will warrant closer examination.
In definitively deciding whether a performance which appeared
insufficient actually was, evaluators must also attempt to delineate
precisely why the court functions as it does. For instance, a circuit that
needs much time to resolve appeals, because it furnishes a high
percentage of oral arguments and published opinions, could be
operating satisfactorily. If slow case treatment can be explained by the
provision of many oral arguments and published opinions, these large
figures should be permitted to offset inexpeditious resolution, while
diverse approaches to appellate disposition, especially ones which
promote court access, might also be acceptable.
Evaluators should similarly address the subjective criteria. That
inquiry is much more complex, as the indicia are rather amorphous and
evaluators will essentially lack the type of raw numerical data which
facilitate comparison of objective information. However, evaluators
might ask, and attempt to answer, analogous questions. These include
whether any court produces disuniform, incoherent or unpredictable
circuit law, whether the court's judges are uncollegial and if so, why, and
what amount of each attribute together or alone would mean that a
circuit is deficient. Evaluators could generally monitor the court's
appeals from filing to disposition in particular areas of law over a period
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of time. Professor Hellman's detailed examination of consistency and its
possible correlation with circuit magnitude specifically shows how
evaluators might proceed. 147 The endeavors of numerous appellate
judges have correspondingly enhanced comprehension of collegiality,148
although evaluators must undertake considerably more work. For
example, evaluators could personally interview appeals court judges or
closely study circuit operations, such as how the courts constitute panels
and assign administrative duties to active circuit judges. 149
After evaluators have thoroughly reviewed the relevant objective and
subjective material, evaluators must consider the information in reaching
overall determinations whether a court does not dispense appellate
justice or function effectively and, therefore, warrants treatment.
Evaluators should carefully differentiate the two judgments and
recognize that a circuit which clearly delivers appellate justice may not
necessarily operate efficaciously. For instance, a court that performs at a
level which is substantially below the national average, absent adequate
justification, even as to one parameter, could be working ineffectively. If
evaluators entertain doubts about any circuit's circumstances at this
point, evaluators might want to explore the advisability of further study
and fruitful means of conducting that analysis, perhaps in conjunction
with experimentation and the miscellany of ideas discussed below. 150
Should evaluators conclusively find that a circuit functions in an
unsatisfactory way, evaluators must designate with precision why.
Answering the question of why a court functions unsatisfactorily will
foster the narrow tailoring of remedies to the specific problems
identified. Evaluators could then formulate the finest solutions. Those
will be measures which respond most efficaciously to the difficulties
delineated while imposing the fewest disadvantages.
Several examples should clarify the approach contemplated. A circuit
that works well, or convincingly explains any failure to so operate, vis-avis all of the applicable objective and subjective parameters, obviously
affords appellate justice and performs effectively and, therefore, will
147
See supra note 130 and accompanying text; see also supra note 131; infra note 157 and
accompanying text (suggesting that Professor George's recent study of en bane measure
shows how to analyze its possible effect on consistency, coherence and predictability).
148
See, e.g., FRANK COFFIN, ON APPEAL 215 (1994); Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and
Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1358-62 (1998); Deanell Reece
Tacha, The "C" Word: On Collegiality, 56 OHIO ST. L. J. 585 (1995).
149
I realize that the Commission did ask the judges about collegiality. See Working
Papers, supra note 6, at 15-35; supra note 110 and accompanying text. I envision more
intensive scrutiny.
150
See infra notes 162-79 and accompanying text.
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require no remediation. In contrast, a court which functions badly,
without sufficient reason, in terms of numerous, important objective
indicia, such as the percentages of oral arguments furnished and time to
disposition, or subjective criteria, namely inconsistent and incoherent
circuit law, may not dispense justice and, therefore, does work
inefficaciously. It, thus, might deserve comparatively drastic solutions,
perhaps including structural reforms like the divisional arrangement, or
at least correctives for ineffective performance. Evaluators will probably
find that most courts operate between these polar opposites. For
example, a circuit which functions rather poorly, while offering
somewhat persuasive justifications based on several objective factors,
such as percentages of published opinions produced or of visiting judges
employed, but works relatively well in terms of many subjective
parameters, namely predictability and collegiality, could provide justice,
yet perform inefficaciously. The court, therefore, may need modest
changes, including the authorization of a few additional judgeships.
I can also illustrate the inquiry envisioned by applying the approach to
the Ninth Circuit, the only appeals court that Congress instructed the
commissioners to emphasize and that the Commission apparently
decided was operating ineffectively enough to warrant treatment.
Evaluators must determine as definitively as feasible whether the Ninth
Circuit does not deliver appellate justice or function efficaciously.
Evaluators might initially want to examine the raw data and other
information that the Commission accumulated, although as the analysis
in the second section suggests, this material alone will not suffice.
Evaluators could specifically consider objective data, namely the
percentages of oral arguments and published opinions which the Ninth
Circuit affords and its time to disposition. However, evaluators must
refine and contextualize the numerical information that the Commission
collected. For instance, the percentages and disposition times might be
calibrated with case complexity, while all of these statistics should allow
for the large number of judicial vacancies on the court since 1995.151
Indeed, one critical question which must be answered is whether Ninth
Circuit operation absent one-fourth of its active judges contributed to
any deficiencies that the Commission seemingly found. Moreover,
evaluators could gather, analyze and synthesize supplemental or new
empirical material, such as information on the uniformity, coherence and
predictability of circuit law as well as on judicial collegiality.

'" See supra notes 38, 40-41, 144 and accompanying text.
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Evaluators may also attempt to ascertain the accuracy of the
perceptions on which the commissioners apparently premised their
decision making, as well as additional subjective criteria related to the
Ninth Circuit, even though the above discussion detailed the problems
in detecting exactly how the Commission reached its judgments and in
applying subjective factors. 152 Notwithstanding these complications,
evaluators may institute some efforts. For example, evaluators ought to
determine as conclusively as possible whether circuit law is actually
inconsistent, incoherent or unpredictable and whether the court's judges
are uncollegial. If any of these phenomena exist, evaluators should
assess whether they can be ascribed to circuit magnitude. Evaluators
should consult, and build upon, earlier, reliable endeavors. illustrative is
a well-respected, scholarly study of uniformity which found that the
pattern of multiple relevant precedents "exemplified by high visibility
issues ... is not characteristic of Ninth Circuit jurisprudence generally.
Nor is intracircuit conflict." 153 During 1993, a Federal Judicial Center
analysis similarly found "little evidence that intracircuit inconsistency is
a significant problem [or] that whatever intracircuit conflict exists is
strongly correlated with circuit size." 154 Similarly, the Appellate Practice
Committee of the American Bar Association Litigation Section detected
"no evidence that a larger circuit necessarily causes significantly more
intracircuit conflicts than a circuit of ten to fifteen judges. "155
Evaluators could correspondingly scrutinize the Ninth Circuit's
limited en bane procedure to ascertain whether it affects uniformity,
coherence or predictability, and if so, precisely how. Evaluators might
specifically attempt to verify some commentators' contention that the
rather infrequent invocation of this mechanism has failed to preserve
consistency and coherence. 156 Professor George's recent work suggests
how evaluators could analyze the court's use of the limited en bane

152

See supra notes 110-15, 120-121 and accompanying text.
See Arthur D.Hellman, Introduction: Adjudication: Efficiency without Depersonalization,
in REsTRUCTURING JUSTICE, supra note 130, at 86; see also MCKENNA, supra note 8, at 94
153

(characterizing scholarly study as "only systematic study of precedent in a large circuit").
15
'
See MCKENNA, supra note 8, at 94.
155

See id.;

SUBCOMM. TO STUDY CIRCUIT SIZE, A.B.A., REl'ORT ON FEDERAL CIRCUIT SIZE

(1993); see also supra note 149 and accompanying text (discussing how to analyze
collegiality).
156
See supra note 110 and accompanying text; Oversight Hearings, supra note 142
(statements of Ass't Atty. Gen. Eleanor Dean Acheson & Sen. Dianne Feinstein); see also
Interim Report, supra note 142, at 5-6 (finding "apparent change in the court's en bane
culture" leading to more en bane cases and quarterly hearings to facilitate them); infra note
159 and accompanying text.
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process. 157 Evaluators also might examine whether Ninth Circuit
magnitude has eroded regionalism and, if so, whether the concept
retains modem salience, especially given increasing globalization,
computerization and tensions between regionalism and the court's
responsibility for federalization. 158
Once evaluators have collected, analyzed and synthesized the
maximum, relevant empirical data and additional applicable material,
the evaluators must decide as definitively as possible whether the Ninth
Circuit fails to provide appellate justice or perform effectively. Should
evaluators remain uncertain at this juncture, evaluators could consider
more study of the court, perhaps together with experimentation and the
other ideas which are explored below. If evaluators conclusively
determine that the Ninth Circuit fails to deliver justice or function
efficaciously, they must comprehensively identify why either occurs and
match solutions with the problems delineated. Respecting the provision
of justice, should evaluators clearly ascertain that the court's size fosters
disuniform, incoherent and unpredictable circuit law, which the limited
en bane device exacerbates, absent justification, these findings' gravity
may indicate dramatic or structural measures, including the divisional
scheme. As to ineffective operation, if evaluators confidently conclude
that the limited en bane technique does not promote consistency,
coherence and predictability, adjustments, such as enlarging the en bane
membership, might be warranted. 159
Evaluators could apply a similar approach to appeals courts apart
from the Ninth Circuit. Should resource limitations preclude replicating
the inquiry for all of the circuits, evaluators might focus on those courts
which the Commission report suggests experience the most difficulty.
For example, the Third, Fourth and Eleventh Circuits perform least well
in terms of certain, important objective parameters, namely the
percentages of oral arguments and published opinions provided as well

See George, supra note 131; see also Hellman, REsTRUCUTING JUSTICE, supra note 130 at
62-78 (analyzing Ninth Circuit's use of limited en bane process); Hug, supra note 3, at 90709.
158
See supra note 138 and accompanying text. Evaluators might correlate panel
assignments with the regions where judges are stationed and appeals arise, but the court's
recent decision to authorize experimentation with panels that include one resident judge
from the region producing the appeal may obviate the need for this exercise. See infra note
166 and accompanying text.
159
See S. 1043, 106th Cong. (1999); see also supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text. Of
course, the court's actual condition and possible need for treatment may differ from the
two examples.
157
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as the number of visiting judges deployed. 160 Evaluators must attempt to
determine with certainty whether and, if so, why any of the courts
actually do not afford appellate justice or work efficaciously and, thus,
needs remediation. 161
B.

Experimentation

1. An Introductory Word

There are several reasons why recommendations for experimentation
deserve comparatively limited exploration in this article. First, the
analysis above indicates that it is preferable to undertake additional
study, because studies of the circuits should permit more definitive
conclusions related to the appeals courts and facilitate future testing and
reform.
Second, numerous suggestions have been rather
comprehensively examined elsewhere,162 while recommendations could
be derived from the Ninth Circuit or the other courts that have
participated in experimentation. For example, the Ninth Circuit has
been the acknowledged national leader in employing many, creative
measures to address docket expansion with rather scarce resources.
Nonetheless, certain prescriptions can be proffered, as sufficient
information currently exists to structure productive testing, which might
proceed at the same time as further study. Moreover, the circuits could
always experiment with promising approaches and ought to continue
applying effective concepts, such as varied alternatives to dispute
resolution and diverse forms of appeals management. 163 This activity
would promote better court administration, increase comprehension of
the tribunals and foster the exchange of beneficial ideas.
160
See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 93 tbls.2 & 3, 108 tbl.6a; see also supra notes 78-82
and accompanying text.
161
When conducting this exercise, evaluators might also ascertain whether suggestions
for improvement can be derived from studying circuits which appear to function rather
well or ineffectively. For example, it would be valuable to know exactly how the First
Circuit writes such a high percentage of published opinions, how the Seventh Circuit relies
so little on visiting judges, and how the Eleventh Circuit terminates such a large number of
appeals per authorized judgeship. In contrast, why do the Third, Fourth and Eleventh
Circuits generate the smallest percentages of published opinions and why are they among
the four courts providing the lowest percentages of oral arguments and constituting the
largest percentages of panels with visitors? See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 93 tbls.2 &
3, 101 tbl.1, 108 tbl.6a.
162
See, e.g., Oversight Hearings, supra note 142; Interim Report, supra note 142; Hug,
supra note 3, at 908-09; Tobias, supra note 4, at 314-15.
163
See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
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2. Specific Suggestions
All of the circuits should canvass their individual circumstances, while
the specific appellate courts might attempt to identify areas that require
improvement and test efficacious measures which would rectify or
ameliorate any difficulties detected. The Ninth Circuit Evaluation
Committee affords an instructive model for the type of effort that I
propose. Every appellate court could also examine the information
collected by the Commission to delineate ways in which each circuit
seems to function less effectively than other courts.
Once the circuits have completed this exercise in introspection and
designated aspects of their operations that might be enhanced, the
appellate courts should specify approaches which warrant
experimentation. One valuable source will be the mechanisms that the
remaining eleven circuits have permanently applied or tested to treat
growing caseloads with relatively restricted resources. The measures
taken by other circuits can be examined three ways: (1) through the
identification of appeals courts which performed comparatively well in
terms of the parameters for which the commissioners assembled
objective empirical data; (2) through intercircuit communication
regarding constructive techniques and; (3) through the Federal Judicial
Center and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts that
serve as national clearinghouses for similar information about the
appellate courts.
The circuits could concomitantly consult the
Commission suggestions, apart from the divisional recommendation.
For instance, appeals courts, such as the Fifth Circuit, which experience
burgeoning caseloads, might consider experimentation with two-judge,
and district court appellate panels, while those circuits that have not
employed bankruptcy appellate panels may want to evaluate their
institution. 164 The appeals courts then should carefully implement
concepts which promise to address any deficiencies found.
The Ninth Circuit must continue deploying the innovative approaches
that have permitted the tribunal to resolve rather expeditiously,
inexpensively, fairly and consistently the largest appellate court docket.
These mechanisms include an executive committee which has important
responsibilities for circuit governance, procedures for identifying

'" See MCKENNA, supra note 8, at 127-33; LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 8, at 131-32;
Final Report, supra note 1, at 31, 62-66, 68; Gordon Berrnant & Judy Sloan, Bankruptcy
Appellate Panels: The Ninth Circuit's Experience, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 181 (1989). Congress should
authorize testing of two-judge, and district court appellate, panels under a statute like that
the Commission proposed.
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appeals that present similar issues, bankruptcy appellate panels and
special screening groups comprised of three judges which each month
resolve 140 cases previously designated by the court's staff as less
complex. 165 The Ninth Circuit also ought to test new approaches, such as
a requirement that every three-judge panel have one member whose
chambers are located in the region from which the appeal arises.166 The
court might derive those ideas from studying the other circuits or from
the work that its Evaluation Committee is performing.
The experimentation which the appellate courts undertake must
receive rigorous analysis. 167 This means that testing should proceed for
enough time in sufficiently diverse contexts to ascertain, with
confidence, the efficacy of the concepts which circuits apply. An expert,
independent entity must scrutinize that experimentation by
systematically assembling, evaluating and synthesizing the greatest
practicable quantity of reliable empirical material. Once appeals courts
have conducted the testing and it has received close assessment,
Congress and appellate judges should be able to determine more
conclusively whether individual circuits do not deliver justice or operate
effectively and, if so, why. Congress and appellate judges must also
designate the most efficacious remedies for any problems delineated.
C. A Miscellany of Additional Ideas

The analysis above suggests that additional study, perhaps combined
with further experimentation, would be the best course of action.
Nevertheless, some members of Congress or the appeals court bench
could find that the condition of a specific circuit or the entire system is
dire enough to reject more evaluation and testing. Other senators and
representatives or appellate judges may believe that the appeals courts
have received adequate analysis, particularly after the recent
Commission effort, or that it is now time to act.
If these circumstances exist, lawmakers and the appellate judiciary
must remember that the efficacious performance of a century-old
institution is at stake and that they should proceed cautiously.

105
See Final Report, supra note 1, at 31; supra note 164 and accompanying text; see also
Hellman, RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE, supra note 130 (analyzing these and other measures);
Tobias, supra note 7, at 240.
1
The court recently instituted experimentation with this requirement. See Oversight
"
Hearings, supra note 142; Interim Report, supra note 142, at 12-13.
1
See BAKER, supra note 43, at 287-301; Tobias, supra note 4, at 314-15; Tobias, supra
"
note 42, at 1283-88.
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Legislators and judges, therefore, might want to consider a miscellany of
possibilities. One valuable contribution which the commissioners made
was to confirm certain conventional wisdom regarding the circuits.
Most important is the idea that virtually all of the appeals courts have
confronted docket increases with comparatively few resources and will
probably face analogous situations in the future. 168 This determination
means that there are two major ways of proceeding. The first is to
decrease the quantity of cases, essentially by restricting federal civil or
criminal jurisdiction, an idea which Commissioners Justice White and
Judge Merritt proffered in their "Additional Views." 169 However, that
option has little promise, because senators and representatives are
apparently unwilling to limit jurisdiction.170 The second alternative,
therefore, is addressing directly the inexorable rise in appeals which
lawyers and litigants bring.
A somewhat controversial means of frontally treating docket growth is
to enlarge the judicial and other resources of individual circuits that
experience difficulties resolving substantial caseloads. For example, an
infusion of judgeships could enable the courts to provide more oral
arguments and published opinions while relying less on visiting judges.
A readily available source for the precise number of judges who might
be needed is the Judicial Conference recommendations for Congress,
which are premised on relatively conservative estimates of appellate
dockets and judicial workloads. 171 The Conference suggestions are
embodied in a proposed measure that senators have introduced. 172 Much
controversy attends the questions whether additional judgeships are
advisable and, if so, precisely how many.
This approach, thus, may be impractical, especially given
congressional refusal to expand the federal bench's size in the last decade
and considerable legislative and judicial opposition to creating new
positions for the system and specific courts. 173 If the idea is too
controversial or lawmakers remain uncertain, temporary judgeships
See Final Report, supra note 1, at ix; supra note 30 and accompanying text.
See Final Report, supra note 1, at 77-88. See generally MCKENNA, supra note 8, at 14153; LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 8, at 134.
170
See, e.g., Stephen G. Breyer, Administering Justice in the First Circuit, 24 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 29, 34-37 (1990); Dragich, supra note 45, at 16-17; William P. Marshall, Federalization: A
Critical Overview, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 719, 722-25 (1995). I emphasize the role of Congress in
168

169

the remainder of this subsection because it must authorize most of the actions proposed.
171
See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
in See S.1145, 106th Cong. (1999).
173
See supra notes 87, 124-28 and accompanying text. See generally Carl Tobias, Federal
Judicial Selection in a Time of Divided Government, 47 EMORY L. J. 527 (1998).
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could be a pragmatic compromise that essentially permits
experimentation. Congress might concomitantly appropriate greater
resources for circuit staff. However, these increases may further
bureaucratize appeals courts which some observers believe are already
too bureaucratic. 174
Legislators and circuit judges should also carefully consider numerous
structural and non-structural measures for addressing caseload growth
that federal court observers have advanced over the last half-century.
The Commission canvassed a number of these approaches and
recommended some.
Senators and representatives may want to
scrutinize those possibilities, such as two-judge, and district court
appellate panels, which the Commission suggested, and decide whether
they warrant experimentation or deserve permanent implementation.
Lawmakers and judges should correspondingly evaluate other
concepts that the commissioners examined but did not prescribe or
minimally explored in their report. These encompass a plethora of
alternatives which federal courts observers, including individuals and
entities that conducted prior studies, have thoroughly surveyed. 175 The
options range along a broad spectrum from abolition of the regional
circuits, to radical reconfiguration of the existing system, to modest
reforms in particular courts, to tinkering with present appellate
procedures.
A constructive action which the Senate should implement for all of the
circuits that now have judicial vacancies is expeditiously filling the
empty seats. This is important because delayed confirmation of judges
for these openings can disrupt smooth court administration. 176 This is
especially true for the Ninth Circuit, which has operated for much of the
time since 1995 absent one-fourth of its active members. 177 Senators
might promptly approve nominees for the three present vacancies on the
Ninth Circuit and ascertain whether this solution rectifies or ameliorates
perceived problems in the Ninth Circuit. For example, if the court were
functioning with all 28 active judges authorized by Congress, the circuit

174
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 26-28 (1985);
CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, JUDICIAL SELF-INTEREST: FEDERAL JUDGES AND COURT
ADMINISTRATION 94-125 (1995); see also Final Report, supra note 1, at 23-25; MCKENNA, supra
note 8, at 49-55.
175
See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 43, at 106-286; sources cited supra note 8.
1
"
See LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 8, at 102-05; see also Gordon Bermant et al., Judicial
Vacancies: An Examination of the Problem and Possible Solutions, 14 M!Ss. C. L. REv. 319, 327
(1994); Tobias, supra note 173, at 539-40, 550-51.
177
See Tobias, supra note 42.
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could afford higher percentages of oral arguments and published
opinions, employ fewer visiting judges and resolve appeals faster.
Legislators and the appellate judiciary as well might scrutinize the
efforts of those appeals courts which work particularly well in order to
ascertain whether approaches that they follow could be applied in other
tribunals. 178 For instance, the circuits which decide cases rather slowly
might derive helpful suggestions by examining appellate courts which
expeditiously conclude appeals. The tribunals must concomitantly
engage in greater intercircuit communication through the exchange of
productive ideas that may improve appeals court operations. illustrative
are bankruptcy appellate panels, which the Ninth Circuit employed so
successfully that Congress required all of the appellate courts to consider
implementing the mechanisms. 179
CONCLUSION

The Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of
Appeals fulfilled its substantial responsibilities to assess the regional
circuits in the brief period which senators and representatives provided.
The commissioners compiled an informative descriptive account of the
appellate courts at century's end. However, the description will not
support conclusive determinations regarding the circuits. Therefore,
Congress should authorize additional study or further experimentation
with promising measures.

See supra note 161.
,,., See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 104(c), 108 Stat. 4106,
4109-10; see also LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 8, at 47; supra note 164 and accompanying
178

text.

